Darfur and the Limits of Legal Deterrence

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ABSTRACT

The Darfur referral to the International Criminal Court demonstrates the limits of international criminal justice as an agent of wartime deterrence evident in the experience of the ICTY in Bosnia. First, international tribunals cannot deter criminal violence as long as states and international institutions are unwilling to take enforcement actions against perpetrators. Second, the key to ending impunity in an ongoing war lies less in legal deterrence than in political strategies of diplomacy, coercion, or force. Third, the contribution of criminal justice in aftermath of mass atrocity is dependent on which strategies are used to put it to an end.

I. INTRODUCTION

On 27 February 2007, the chief prosecutor at the International Criminal Court (ICC) identified a former interior minister and a militia leader as the first two individuals he planned to try for atrocity crimes committed in the Darfur region of western Sudan.1 The case had been referred to the court by the UN Security Council almost two years earlier, due in large part to

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intense lobbying from the human rights community. Among the arguments made on behalf of the referral was the ability of the court to deter violence against civilians in an ongoing war. This was the conclusion of the UN International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, which had recommended the referral to “take on the responsibility to . . . end the rampant impunity prevailing there.” Following the referral, Richard Dicker of Human Rights Watch applauded it as a “historic step” that “offers real hope of protection for people in Darfur.” When the prosecutor announced his first two cases, David Mozersky of the International Crisis Group expressed the hope that this might prove to be a turning point in the conflict: “the ICC may be able to succeed in Darfur, where there is little international political will for tough action and the UN Security Council is deadlocked.”

Despite these predictions, subjecting the Sudanese government to criminal scrutiny has had no discernible impact on the level of violence against civilians in Darfur and, if the past is any indication, is unlikely to do so unless there is international political will for tough action, either within or outside the Security Council. This was the experience in Bosnia where, as in Darfur, a criminal justice mechanism—the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)—was established with the goal of combating impunity before the war had ended. However, it was only able to play a meaningful role after Western powers took coercive actions to end the war. This article draws on the strategic studies scholarship on deterrence and coercion by Thomas Schelling and Alexander George to distill from the Bosnian experience three lessons as to the relationship between international criminal justice and wartime impunity, which are then applied to the current situation in Darfur.

First, international criminal justice cannot end impunity in an ongoing war as long as states and intergovernmental organizations are unwilling to take enforcement actions. In Bosnia, the ICTY had little impact on the murder and forced displacement of civilians when the UN and NATO were unwilling to move beyond neutral peacekeeping and mediation—a condition that characterizes international involvement in Darfur today, notwithstanding the referral to the ICC. It was only when NATO was willing to use force, both


directly and via proxy, that the attacks on civilians ended and the ICTY was able to prosecute anyone of significance.

Second, the key to ending criminal violence in an ongoing war is not deterrence, which is aimed at dissuading someone from initiating proscribed behavior, but rather compellence, the act of preventing someone from continuing actions on which he has already embarked. The threat of prosecution is unlikely to deter because, by the time a tribunal asserts jurisdiction, large-scale crimes have already taken place and in most cases, as was the case in Bosnia and is the case in Darfur, responsibility lies with top political and military leaders. As a result, attaching legal liability does not create an incentive to refrain from criminal activity. The challenge is to prevent the continuation of crimes that have already been set in motion, and that requires compelling the target to change its behavior.

According to Schelling, compellence can take one of two forms. First, it can involve brute force to defeat the perpetrators. This can take place through internal forces, as when the Rwandan Patriotic Front ousted the genocidal Hutu regime, or through external intervention, as when British troops assisted a UN force in defeating the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone. Second, it can involve coercion where the goal is not to defeat the perpetrators, but to use the threat or the demonstrative infliction of punishment to change their behavior by convincing them that it is in their interest to comply with the coercer’s demands. The purpose of the NATO bombing campaign against the Bosnian Serbs, initiated in late August 1995, was to raise the costs and risks of continued criminal violence for Milošević to a point where he believed that maintaining his power required him to rein in his allies and to put an end to the war. Comparable arguments are made today vis-à-vis Sudan, whereby oil sanctions or the enforcement of a no-fly zone are proposed as levers to get Khartoum to disarm the militias and accept deployment of a robust UN force to protect civilians in Darfur.

Third, the kind of criminal justice approach that is feasible in the aftermath of mass atrocity is dependent on the strategies that are used to put it to an end. If the perpetrators have been physically defeated, their leaders can be put on trial because they lack the power to prevent it. If one relies instead on coercion, this is more problematic because success involves persuading leaders to put an end to criminal violence for which they are probably complicit. The strategic studies literature indicates that coercion is likely to be successful if threats are accompanied by reassurances and if the coercer’s demands do not impinge on the vital security or survival interests of the regime. This means that a strategy of coercive conflict resolution would have

6. See Schelling, supra note 5, at 69–86.
7. Id. at ch. 1.
8. Id. at 4
to refrain from the prosecution of leaders whose cooperation is needed to make the strategy work—at least until conditions change. In Bosnia, indicting Milošević in 1995, as some international lawyers recommended, would have been counterproductive to ending the war because NATO’s strategy was premised on Milošević’s cooperation in signing and maintaining a peace agreement. Indicting Milošević during the Kosovo war did not create comparable problems because NATO’s strategy was to coerce the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army and did not anticipate a continuing relationship with Milošević. The lesson that should be drawn from these episodes is that if the international community moves toward a policy of humanitarian coercion to stop the political violence in Darfur, who can be prosecuted will depend on whose cooperation is needed for a political settlement.

II. LEGAL DETERRENCE VERSUS COERCIVE DIPLOMACY: THE LESSONS OF BOSNIA

One of the central goals of the ICC is the deterrence of “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community.” This mission is laid out in the preamble to its founding Rome Statute: “to put an end to impunity for perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes.” Central to its deterrent potential is the fact that the ICC is a permanent institution, independent of the warring parties, and not subject to the changing national interests of the states that created it. In theory, this enhances not only its general deterrence vis-à-vis international society as a whole, but also specific deterrence on the parties to an existing armed conflict, such as the one in Darfur. As one non-governmental organization (NGO) study put it, the ICC is “in the unique position to serve as a potential deterrent for future incidents of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Darfur. Because it is a permanent international criminal court and can investigate ongoing incidents, an indictment or conviction from the ICC can send a clear message to human rights violators that such acts will be met with swift justice.” This is also why many NGOs oppose proposals

to suspend criminal proceedings during peace negotiations, either through Security Council intervention or through the prosecutor exercising discretion. According to Human Rights Watch, such an approach would “mean that prosecutions should only occur well after the crimes have been committed, long after instability has ceased. This would completely undermine any short-term deterrent value that the court might have through investigating current crimes.”

The assumption that investigating crimes in an ongoing war could play a deterrent role was also one of the official rationales for the creation of the ICTY. In the past, war crimes tribunals had been established at the end of armed conflicts, but the ICTY was created on 25 May 1993, roughly one year after the outbreak of the war in Bosnia. Among its goals, as spelled out in Security Council Resolution 827, was “the maintenance and the restoration of peace,” a novel objective for such a tribunal. One of the ways in which it would do so was through its deterrent impact on the commission of future atrocities. This goal was expressed in the public diplomacy of several members of the Security Council, including the French ambassador, who asserted that it “would send a clear message to those who continue to commit these crimes that they will be held accountable for their acts.”

As an instrument for deterring atrocities during the Bosnian War, the ICTY had no meaningful impact. Ethnic cleansing, led principally by Serb and Croat forces whose leaders were under investigation, continued unabated, as did interference with humanitarian relief operations and attacks on UN peacekeepers. In fact, on 7 July 1995, more than two years after the creation of the ICTY, General Ratko Mladić’s forces perpetrated the worst single atrocity of the Bosnian war when they overran and ethnically cleansed the UN-protected safe area of Srebrenica, murdering more than 7,000 Muslim men and boys, despite the fact that less than three months earlier, ICTY prosecutor Richard Goldstone had asked the Bosnian government to defer to his investigation of Mladić. On the day of Mladić’s indictment two weeks later, his forces invaded Zepa, another UN-protected safe area, and shortly thereafter, they resumed the shelling of Sarajevo.

One of the reasons why the threat of prosecution had little influence during the Bosnian war was the failure to meet the formal requirements for effective deterrence. In a study of the impact of war crimes tribunals on state behavior, Christopher Rudolph identified those requirements as capability, commitment, and credibility. The ICTY lacked the capability to enforce its own decisions because it had no police force to stop and arrest those indicted. The NATO forces working with the UN in Bosnia did have that capability, though they were under the control of the UN and national governments which would have had to consent to their use as an enforcement arm of the court. In theory, they should have been obligated to enforce the law since the Security Council had invoked Chapter VII, both in declaring the ethnic cleansing to be a threat to international peace and security and in subjecting its architects to criminal scrutiny. What followed, however, indicated that the creation of the ICTY was more a means of deflecting pressure for tough action than it was a commitment to stopping criminal violence. If that commitment were genuine, one should have expected enforcement actions against perpetrators and in defense of victims. Instead, the principal conflict resolution strategy was impartial mediation, and many diplomats were either dismissive of the ICTY or believed that it would complicate the peace process. The same even-handedness informed the imposition of an arms embargo on all the parties in Bosnia, effectively favoring the Serbs because they were supported by the Yugoslav National Army. The Security Council authorized the deployment of a UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia, but its initial mandate was the neutral protection of humanitarian relief operations—i.e., addressing the symptoms of ethnic cleansing rather than its causes. Even when that mandate was augmented to include the protection of safe areas, member states were unwilling to deploy enough troops to make it credible, and UN and NATO officials were often reluctant to make good on those commitments because of the risks to peacekeepers. This was well understood in Pale and Belgrade, which meant that UN and NATO threats lacked credibility. As Ruti Teitel observed, the ICTY was “forced to seek criminal punishment within a political vacuum.”

20. For an analysis of the political motives of Western governments in creating the ICTY, see David P. Forsythe, International Criminal Courts: A Political View, 15 Neth. Q. Hum. Rts. 5 (1997).
23. Id. at 145–55.
Some proponents of international criminal justice acknowledge that the ICTY had limited deterrent impact during the Bosnian war, but attributed that to the exceptional nature of war crimes tribunals at that time—a problem that could be remedied if there was a stronger commitment to national and international prosecutions.\textsuperscript{25} Others, such as Goldstone, pointed to the “lack of political will on the part of leading Western nations to support and enforce the orders of the tribunal.”\textsuperscript{26} As a means of preventing mass atrocity in an ongoing war, these arguments conflate the strategic concepts of deterrence and compellence. Deterrence is designed to prevent someone from initiating criminal activity. Yet, by the time an international criminal tribunal asserts jurisdiction in an ongoing conflict, large-scale atrocities have already occurred and responsibility almost certainly resides in the top leadership of governments and rebel groups. In other words, those one would like to deter, such as General Mladić, have already committed the crimes that would get them “sent to The Hague.” Judicial scrutiny does not create any new incentive to desist. In these circumstances, what is required to end impunity is not deterrence, but compellence—i.e., stopping or reversing actions already taken.\textsuperscript{27} This is because the real source of impunity in places like Bosnia (or Darfur) is that the perpetrators believe that the internal balance of forces on the ground enables them to impose their will without meaningful resistance, and the lack of international political will to stop them means that they can do so without incurring significant external costs.

A strategy of compellence can change these calculations either through: (1) brute force, to physically defeat the target or (2) coercion, to convince the target to change its behavior through the threat of punishment. The second strategy could involve both non-military measures, such as economic sanctions, or military force. If force is used, the distinction from the first strategy is its purpose. Brute force is designed to defeat the adversary or reduce its capability to a point where its cooperation is unnecessary. Coercion seeks to elicit its cooperation through the threat or limited use of violence.\textsuperscript{28}

A recent illustration of the role of brute force in ending impunity—and the limits of legal mechanisms in its absence—is the British intervention in Sierra Leone in the summer of 2000 to assist UN forces in defeating the RUF, a rebel group that had abducted thousands of children as soldiers and had terrorized civilians through a campaign of mutilation, rape, and murder. This followed the RUF’s violation of the 1999 Lomé Peace Accord, when it returned to political violence and took UN peacekeepers hostage. Some in

\textsuperscript{25} Theodor Meron, \textit{From Nuremberg to The Hague}, 149 MILITARY L. REV. 107, 111 (1995).
\textsuperscript{26} Richard Goldstone, \textit{Bringing War Criminals to Justice during an Ongoing War in HARD CHOICES: MORAL DILEMMAS IN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION} 202 (Jonathan Moore ed., 1998).
\textsuperscript{27} Schelling, \textit{supra} note 5, at 69.
\textsuperscript{28} On the distinction between brute force and coercion, see \textit{id.} ch. 1.
the human rights community attributed the breakdown of Lomé to its blanket amnesty, a decision that reinforced the RUF’s belief in its own impunity by ignoring the deterrent contribution of prosecution. This argument mistakes symptoms for causes. What made for the RUF’s impunity after Lomé was the fact that it had not been defeated militarily, that Nigeria, which led the West African peacekeeping force that had kept it at bay, wanted to pull out of Sierra Leone, and that the UN was only willing to replace that force with neutral peacekeepers. That impunity only ended with the British intervention, without which the RUF would not have been defeated and there would never have been a Special Court for Sierra Leone to try those most responsible for atrocities during that country’s brutal civil war.

Strategies of coercion, by contrast, seek not to incapacitate an opponent, but rather to “erode his motivation to continue what he is doing” by the “expectation of costs of sufficient magnitude.” Such strategies can involve the use of non-forcible measures, such as economic sanctions. After East Timor’s vote for independence from Indonesia in 1999, militias supported by the Indonesian army went on a rampage of looting and large-scale violence against civilians. In response, the Clinton administration threatened to link future IMF and World Bank loans to Indonesia’s willingness to stop the violence. Given Jakarta’s vulnerability to such sanctions during the Asian Financial Crisis, it agreed to withdraw its forces and end its support for the militias, creating a permissive environment for the deployment of an Australian-led peacekeeping force.

In the strategic studies literature, the military variant of this strategy is referred to as “coercive diplomacy,” which is defined as the threat or “exemplary use of quite limited force to persuade the opponent to back down.” This was the United States-led NATO strategy from 28 August to 14 September 1995, when it initiated Operation Deliberate Force, a bombing campaign against Bosnian Serb military targets, pursued in combination with a Croatian offensive to retake the Krajina, which Serbia had conquered in 1991, and a joint Croat-Bosnian offensive in Western Bosnia. The purpose of force was not to defeat the Serbs militarily, but to convince Milosˇevi´c that he was overextended, that time was not on the side of the Bosnian Serbs, and that

33. Traub, supra note 30, at 103–08.
34. George, Forceful Persuasion, supra note 5, at 5.
it was in his interest to compromise and end the war.\textsuperscript{35} This, in turn, was a prerequisite to gaining the consent of all three warring parties to the Dayton Peace Agreement and the deployment of a NATO peacekeeping operation.

Coercive diplomacy, however, is problematic from the standpoint of international criminal justice because its purpose is to alter the way a target calculates its interests. The scholarly literature on coercive diplomacy indicates that this is most likely to be achieved if “the objective selected—and the demand made—by the coercing power reflects only the most important of its interests” rather than those that “infringe on the vital or very important interests of the adversary.”\textsuperscript{36} If the central goal of coercive bargaining with an abusive government is to end a war whose principal victims are civilians, success depends on whether threats and punishments can convince the target that compliance is necessary for its long-term security. If those goals are expanded to include the criminal prosecution of its leaders, then this amounts to a demand for regime change, making the target’s compliance all but impossible. The coercer is then confronted with the choice of acquiescing to a morally intolerable status quo or escalating the use of force to a point where the target is defeated and its cooperation is no longer necessary. By the summer of 1995, neither of these options was palatable to the US and NATO in Bosnia. Hence, at Dayton, they dealt with Milošević through a bargaining paradigm rather than a criminal justice paradigm.\textsuperscript{37}

Many NGOs and human rights lawyers opposed these compromises with criminal justice. One line of argument is that the conflict between justice and peace has been exaggerated.\textsuperscript{38} Despite the warnings of some UN officials and international mediators, the indictments of Karadžić and Mladić did not derail the Dayton peace process. Nor did the 1999 indictment of Milošević prevent a resolution of the Kosovo war that enabled the refugees to return to their homes.\textsuperscript{39} In fact, the indictments helped marginalize disruptive actors who would likely have threatened the postwar peace processes.\textsuperscript{40}


\textsuperscript{36} \textit{George, Forceful Persuasion}, supra note 5, at 13.

\textsuperscript{37} During the peace negotiations, Hobrooke showed Milošević the CIA file documenting his communications with Arkan, one of the most vicious Serb paramilitary leaders, in order to press him to crack down on the Bosnian Serbs, over whom he had more control than he claimed. This evidence was not shared with Goldstone to build a legal case against Milošević for his complicity with criminal violence in Bosnia. See Pierre Hazan, \textit{Justice in a Time of War: The True Story Behind the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia} 192 (2004); \textit{Bass, supra note 17}, at 236–37.


The problem with this argument is that it generalizes from individual cases without accounting for the political (i.e., bargaining) contexts in which the indictments were issued. Alexander George observed that “the objective of coercive diplomacy and the means employed on its behalf are likely to be sensitive to the type of relationship the coercing power plans to have with the opponent after the crisis is over.”  

41. See George, Forceful Persuasion, supra note 5, at 71.

This means that the impact of criminal justice on peace processes depends on whether the cooperation of those who might be targets of prosecution is necessary to negotiate and maintain a political settlement. In 1995, United States envoy Richard Holbrooke concluded that it was futile to negotiate with Karadžić and Mladić since they were spoilers who had reneged on virtually every commitment they had made to international mediators. He therefore sought to bypass them and concentrate his pressure on Milošević to both speak for them and to rein them in. Indicting Karadžić and Mladić assisted this strategy. Indicting Milošević would have undermined it because his cooperation was seen as necessary to negotiate and implement Dayton.  


The actual indictment of Milošević during the Kosovo War took place in a different bargaining context, in which Milošević was seen as the principal source of instability in the region rather than the key to the peace process. As a result, Milošević’s continuing cooperation was not necessary for NATO’s war termination strategy. All that was required was the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Third Army from Kosovo.  


Another critique, put forward by some international lawyers, rejected peace negotiations with Milošević because they accommodated a war criminal.  

44. See Williams & Scharf, supra note 15, at 151–69.

Indeed, as Schelling notes, successful coercive diplomacy requires accommodation as well as confrontation: “threats require corresponding assurances; the objective of a threat is to give somebody a choice.”  

45. Schelling, supra note 5, at 74.

At Dayton, those assurances included an autonomous Republika Srpska comprising 49 percent of the country, no mandatory surrender of indicted war criminals on pain of sanctions, and a promise to move toward normalized economic relations.  

46. Paul Williams and Michael Scharf condemn this as a strategy of “coercive appeasement” which sacrificed justice by ratifying the gains made through ethnic cleansing and legitimizing a man who should have been prosecuted.  

47. Instead, they advocate a policy of legal rectitude that rejects negotiations with war criminals. In this, they criticize not only
Holbrooke, but also Goldstone for not indicting Milošević in 1995 under the theory of command responsibility, even if there was not yet sufficient direct evidence of his complicity in the crimes he set in motion. By not pursuing a more aggressive prosecutorial strategy, the ICTY failed in “its proper role in influencing the peace process by precluding negotiations with those responsible for international crimes.”

It also undermined the court’s deterrent role, convincing Milošević that he could return to the practice of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo three years later without any legal consequence.

If one refuses to engage criminal leaders in an ongoing war, the premise underlying that choice is the belief that the continuation of the war is likely to lead to a better outcome than a negotiated compromise. Williams and Scharf acknowledge this in asserting that justice can provide moral backing for a more robust use of force on behalf of the victims, though they do not explicitly lay out the specific strategy that should have been pursued. The closest they come to doing so is in their critique of the decision to pressure the Croatian and Bosnian forces to accept a cease-fire in October 1995, noting that “if the offensive continued, the Croats and Bosnians may well have been able to defeat the Serbian forces and thereby reunify Bosnia.”

A case can be made that the continuation of the war might have led to a more just and stable peace than the compromises at Dayton. There is also reason to be skeptical of that case, given Croatia’s expulsion of Serb civilians following its reconquest of the Krajina and the fact that its leader, Franjo Tudjman, was as guilty as Milošević in seeking the ethnic partition of Bosnia, which included the brutal deportation of the Muslim population of Mostar in May 1993. Indeed, Williams and Scharf acknowledge this and assert that Tudjman should have been indicted simultaneously with Milošević in 1995. This raises the question of whether it was possible to reconcile legal rectitude with the legitimate use of force.

Whatever the merits of the argument for allowing the war to continue, what was more important was that both the United States and the European powers were committed to a negotiated solution. Both feared that continued fighting could have triggered direct Serbian intervention and a wider war. Were Goldstone to have indicted Milošević, in order to exclude him from peace talks, the negotiations would likely have taken place anyway and there

50. Id. at 156; See also Williams & Taft, supra note 48, at 222.
51. David Rohde suggests that allowing the war to continue might have weakened Milošević’s grip on power in David Rohde, Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica, Europe’s Worst Massacre Since World War II 340 (1997).
52. Williams & Scharf, supra note 15, at 120–21.
would have been a serious risk that the ICTY would not have been part of the Dayton accords. Moreover, it is unclear how indicting Milošević in 1995 would have dissuaded him in Kosovo since he would have remained a criminal subject to an arrest warrant regardless of what he did. The actual approach to justice employed at Dayton—maintaining the ICTY and not granting any amnesties—was better positioned to influence Milošević’s behavior since, in Pierre Hazan’s words, it held a “sword of Damocles” over him that might fall in response to future behavior. Hazan is critical of politicians using the court as a “means of pressure, in the same way they would use threats of sanctions or air strikes.” While instrumentalizing justice in this way is contrary to the kind of legal rectitude advocated by proponents of international criminal justice, it is more consistent with the logic of deterrence. The fact that it did not deter Milošević in Kosovo indicates that the threat of prosecution—and more importantly, the threat of using force—was not seen as sufficiently credible to Milošević to influence his aims.

III. THE DARFUR REFERRAL TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

A. The Road to the ICC

The Darfur case was referred to the ICC on 31 March 2005, roughly two years after the outbreak of the war. This war was the latest in a series of violent conflicts that have their origins in the competition between African farmers and Arab herders for control over arable land that has been receding as the result of drought and desertification. The conflict has also been exacerbated by Khartoum’s neglect of the region in terms of its development priorities, and its “divide and rule” policies that have favored Darfur’s Arab inhabitants, from whom they have recruited militias who have targeted the region’s non-Arab population.

The catalyst for the most recent violence was the Naivasha peace process, which provided the blueprint for ending the Sudanese civil war between the

54. One ICTY official interviewed by Bass, acknowledged this constraint: “You have two options . . . A, you can indict Milošević and be shut down. B, or you can do low-level [indictments] and do a few trials, like Mladić and Karadžić.” Cited in Bass, supra note 17, at 229.
55. Hazan, supra note 37, at 192.
56. Id.
57. On the failure of deterrence and coercive diplomacy in the period leading up to the Kosovo war, see Burg, supra note 35, at 70–84.
Islamist Arab government in Khartoum and John Garang’s Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), which represents the predominantly Christian and animist population in the south. In February 2003, just one week after the first round of peace negotiations, two rebel groups, the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), attacked government installations in order to protest Darfur’s exclusion from the power and resource-sharing arrangements that were part of the north-south agreement. The government largely ignored these attacks until a joint SLA-JEM force overran the El Fasher air base on 25 April 2003.\footnote{59}

The El Fasher attack alarmed Kharotum, which saw in it the risk of secession and political disintegration at a time when it was committing itself to regional autonomy, and possible independence, in the south. The government was therefore determined to defeat the rebels militarily, both directly through the Sudanese army and air force, and by proxy, through recruiting Arab tribal militias who became known as the \textit{janjaweed}.\footnote{60} Its counter-insurgency strategy was not to engage the SLA and JEM directly. Rather, it was to attack the region’s African population from whom the rebels derived their support, or as Gérard Prunier put it, using Mao’s famous metaphor, to “drain the pond in which the guerrillas swim.”\footnote{61} This involved strafing villages with helicopter gunships and bombing with improvised Antonov supply planes. The \textit{janjaweed} would follow up by attacking the villages, engaging in murder, rape, torture, looting, the burning of homes, the destruction of livestock, and the poisoning of wells. The underlying strategy, as put forth in a directive from \textit{janjaweed} leader Musa Hilal to government intelligence services, was to “change the demography of Darfur and empty it of African tribes.”\footnote{62} As Adam Lebor observed, this was “the Miloševi´c model, adjusted for África.”\footnote{63}

In 2003, Darfur was not a human rights priority of the international community. There were warnings of an impending catastrophe from some NGOs, such as Amnesty International, and from Jan Egeland, the UN undersecretary for humanitarian affairs.\footnote{64} Nonetheless, the principal concern of the UN Secretariat, and most of the international community, vis-à-vis Sudan was the Naivasha peace process—there was a reluctance to address Darfur in a way that might complicate Naivasha’s completion. As a result,
the United Nations initial response was similar to that in Bosnia; namely, to treat Darfur as a humanitarian problem by addressing the symptoms of the violence rather than its causes, and as a diplomatic problem, by assisting a negotiating process comparable to the one that was ending the war between Khartoum and the SPLA.65

Darfur began to emerge as a human rights priority in the spring of 2004. On 21 March, Mukesh Kapila, the UN Coordinator in Sudan, gave an interview with the BBC—without his superiors’ authorization—accusing the government and the janjaweed of “an organized attempt to do away with a group of people” and analogizing the situation to the early phases of the Rwandan genocide.66 Kapila’s interview generated considerable publicity and was followed by Jan Egeland’s testimony before the Security Council on government and janjaweed responsibility for ethnic cleansing, a speech by Kofi Annan to the UN Human Rights Commission in which he suggested the possibility of humanitarian intervention, and a report by the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights confirming massive and criminal violations of human rights.67 The publicity also galvanized several NGOs to raise the profile of the Darfur case. Within the United States, it catalyzed the creation of the Save Darfur Coalition an alliance of liberal human rights groups and religious conservatives, whose cooperation in opposing Khartoum’s human rights abuses in the south was extended to Darfur.68 This, in turn, got the attention of the Bush administration. While it did not want to rock the boat on Naivasha, for which it played a key mediating role, or on the growing counter-terrorism cooperation with Sudan, its public diplomacy on Darfur became increasingly outspoken.69

The Security Council’s first reference to Darfur was a short paragraph in Resolution 1547 (11 June 2004), whose purpose was to endorse and pledge support for the north-south peace process.70 Within that context, it did call on the “parties to use their influence to bring an immediate halt to the fighting in the Darfur region.” It also welcomed the cease-fire that was negotiated in N’djamena in April, and endorsed its monitoring by the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS).71 This was the first official statement of the United Nations then-existing policy of applying to Darfur the same kind of impartial Chapter VI model used in Naivasha.

65. Prunier, supra note 58, at 107.
67. Id. at 220-21.
68. Lebor, supra note 63, at 195.
69. Prunier, supra note 58, at 139.
Security Council Resolution 1556 (30 July 2004)—the first specifically on Darfur—superficially changed this approach by calling on Khartoum to disarm the *janjaweed* within thirty days and bring its leaders to justice. Bellamy characterized it as a “Janus-faced resolution,” because it invoked Chapter VII, indicating a threat to international peace that required enforcement, but neither criticized the government nor spelled out what specific sanctions would be imposed should the government fail to comply. And while it imposed an arms embargo on “all non-governmental entities and individuals” in the Darfur region, that did not extend to the government, which was arming and supporting the *janjaweed*. As with the Bosnian arms embargo, this was an ostensibly neutral action that worked to the advantage of the stronger party.

The reason for the weak enforcement provisions was the configuration of state interests in the Security Council. The United States took the most forceful stand, both rhetorically and in its advocacy of an explicit threat of sanctions. Sudan was very skillful in countering this by characterizing the United States’ position as a form of neocolonial interference, and by analogizing it to some of the rationales the Bush administration had put forward to justify the war in Iraq. This argument had strong resonance with many governments from the South, particularly the Arab League, who were skeptical of humanitarian arguments that could be used as encroachments on national sovereignty. China and Russia also opposed sanctions, in part on sovereignty grounds, but also due to economic self-interest, since China is the largest investor in Sudan’s oil production and Russia is a major supplier of arms. Other countries, such as Great Britain, were concerned that a confrontational policy might complicate the Naivasha process, a concern shared by many within the UN Secretariat. Nor did the United States expend much diplomatic capital in building a stronger consensus since Darfur was not a priority issue.

Calls for tougher action against the Sudanese government intensified after the Secretary General’s report found substantial noncompliance with Security Council directives. The United States also adopted a stronger rhetorical position when Secretary of State Colin Powell testified to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “genocide has occurred and

73. Alex Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq, 19 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 31, 43 (2005).
74. S.C. Res. 1556, supra note 72, ¶ 7.
75. Bellamy, supra note 73, at 41.
76. IGRI & LYMAN, supra note 64, at 16.
77. Bellamy, supra note 73, at 45.
79. IGRI & LYMAN, supra note 64, at 17.
may still be occurring in Darfur.” Powell did add that “no new action is dictated by this designation,” meaning that the United States was not going to try to stop the violence on its own. Instead, it would push for stronger multilateral actions, citing Article 8 of the Genocide Convention, which requires state parties to call on the “competent organs of the United Nations” to take action to prevent and suppress genocide. At the Security Council, the United States circulated a draft resolution that declared Sudan to be in material breach of Resolution 1556, expanded the African Union (AU) force, imposed targeted sanctions, and initiated an investigation as a first step toward establishing accountability.

Security Council Resolution 1564 (18 September 2004) fell considerably short of the more forceful approach advocated by the United States and several activist groups, largely because of the same coalitions of national interest that blocked tough action in July. It did reiterate its call on the Sudanese government to disarm and prosecute the janjaweed, and for the augmentation of the AU peacekeeping force. There was, however, no explicit criticism of the Sudanese government, no imposition of sanctions for noncompliance, nor their explicit linkage to future compliance beyond the possible future consideration of sanctions against Sudan’s oil sector or government officials. As Julie Flint and Alex de Waal put it, “Khartoum crossed the Security Council’s red line. Nothing happened.”

The resolution did take the first steps toward the ICC when it called on the Secretary General to set up an International Commission of Inquiry (ICI), whose mandate was to investigate violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law, to determine whether genocide has taken place, and “to identify the perpetrators of such violations with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable.” The Commission’s report, which was released on 25 January 2005, found that the government and the militias were responsible for widespread and systematic attacks on the civilian population that constituted war crimes and crimes against humanity, but not genocide, as Powell had alleged, because the government’s intent in attacking civilians was to fight a counter-insurgency war, not to exterminate a protected group. Even though it could not substantiate the genocide charge,
that did not diminish its assessment of the gravity of crimes in Darfur because “the crimes against humanity and war crimes may be no less serious and heinous than genocide.”'87 Responsibility for these crimes was attributed to the most senior officials in the Sudanese military and government, and the commission compiled a confidential list of fifty-one names that should be investigated by a competent prosecutor. The Security Council was urged to refer the case to the ICC, the legal body best equipped to render expeditious and impartial justice.'88

This last recommendation triggered a two-month controversy over the proper venue for prosecution.'89 To the supporters of the ICC in the UN and the NGO community, the Commission’s recommendation was the logical choice. However, since Sudan is a non-party to the Rome Statute, the Darfur case could only be referred to the ICC through a Security Council resolution, which meant overcoming potential vetoes from China, Russia, and also, from the foremost advocate of tougher measures, the United States. This was because the Bush administration, which saw the ICC as a threat to its freedom of action to use military force and to US sovereignty, had been waging a campaign both to delegitimize the court and to immunize Americans everywhere from its reach. As a result, it initially opposed the referral because, as the US Ambassador for War Crimes, Pierre Richard Prosper stated, “We don’t want to be party to legitimizing the I.C.C.”'90 In its stead, the United States proposed an African court, either using the existing Rwandan tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania, or creating a new ad hoc tribunal through the AU.'91 The US position was sharply criticized by NGO supporters of the ICC and by the UN Special Rapporteur for Genocide, Juan Mendez, who wrote that since the ICC was already in place, it was “the quickest and most effective way to initiate judicial proceedings.”'92 The position was also rejected by the European Union, including the United Kingdom, for whom the ICC referral was non-negotiable.'93 Given the United States isolation on this issue, and the dissonance between its public diplomacy on Darfur and its anti-ICC stance, its position was politically unsustainable. As a result, it sought a compromise that would allow it to maintain its opposition to the ICC while acquiescing to the referral.'94

87. Id. ¶ 522.
88. Id. ¶¶ 571–72.
89. Bellamy & Williams, supra note 78, at 155.
93. Bellamy & Williams, supra note 78, at 155.
The Darfur case was sent to the ICC through Security Council Resolution 1593 on 31 March 2005, with eleven affirmative votes and four abstentions, including China and the United States. The US abstention was obtained in exchange for an exemption from ICC jurisdiction for all non-party states involved in UN or AU authorized operations in the Sudan. This concession to the Bush administration was sharply criticized by the court’s supporters in the NGO community, who nonetheless welcomed the referral as an important step toward ending impunity in Darfur. The Secretary General then put the process in motion by handing the prosecutor the list of fifty-one names that had been compiled by the Commission of Inquiry. On 1 June 2005, the Prosecutor accepted the case and initiated a formal investigation.

B. The Impact of the ICC on Impunity in Darfur

One of the central arguments deployed by proponents of the ICC referral was that prosecution would deter criminal violence, and hence, provide protection to civilians. As evidence of this, some human rights advocates who visited Sudan observed that several government officials and militia leaders expressed concern about becoming international fugitives who might get “sent to The Hague.” That was one of the reasons why many NGOs expressed a sense of urgency in using a court that was already operational rather than waiting, as the United States had proposed, to create a new, African tribunal. As Human Rights Watch Executive Director, Kenneth Roth stated, “The I.C.C. could start saving lives now.” Roth also analogized the potential contribution of the ICC in Darfur to that of the ICTY in Bosnia: “If the ICC takes up Darfur, the government would have to begin high-level prosecutions or, as in Bosnia when an international tribunal launched its own prosecution, abusive leaders would be marginalized as they tried to evade arrest. Either result would help curb the violence.”

101. Roth, Bring the Darfur Killers, supra note 99.
The reason why the ICC referral has had no impact on “saving lives” in Darfur lies in the problem with the Bosnian analogy. The ICTY’s indictments of Mladić and Karadžić did indeed contribute to the curbing ethnic violence by isolating the most virulent ethnic extremists, but only after the war had ended, and that required NATO’s use of air power and a range of other coercive measures against Pale and Belgrade. By contrast, when NATO and the UN issued empty threats they were unwilling to enforce, and were reluctant to move beyond neutral peacekeeping and impartial mediation, those under investigation or indictment were hardly marginalized. It was only when the purported commitment to punish criminal behavior was complemented by a determination to stop and prevent it that impunity on the ground ended, and the ICTY was able to play a constructive role in removing criminal spoilers from the political scene.

The problem with the Darfur referral is that it was issued in an international political context comparable to Bosnia prior to August 1995. First, the referral was not accompanied by any meaningful change in the penalties threatened, or imposed, on Khartoum for noncompliance with previous resolutions. The Security Council did pass a sanctions resolution (1591) two days before the ICC referral, but its provisions were incommensurate with a commitment to subject the government to criminal scrutiny. Those sanctions did not include oil, which represents 90 percent of the government’s export earnings, because of the threat of a Chinese veto. In addition, the arms embargo was not extended from the Darfur region to the government. In fact, Russia was completing a sale of Antonov supply planes as the Security Council was deliberating. Smart sanctions, such as travel bans or asset freezes, were neither imposed on the Sudanese leadership nor explicitly linked to compliance with previous Security Council resolutions. Instead, the Security Council established a committee to recommend targeted sanctions against those persons found to be most responsible for cease-fire violations and atrocities against civilians. On 25 April 2006, more than one year later, the Security Council accepted the committee’s recommendation, applying sanctions even-handedly on a Sudanese military official, janjaweed leader Musa Hilal, and two rebel commanders.

A second parallel with the ICTY during the Bosnian war is the unwillingness of the UN or regional actors to move beyond neutral peacekeeping and mediation. The Security Council did authorize a peacekeeping force, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) three days before the ICC

104. IGIRI & LYMAN, supra note 64, at 24.
105. S.C. Res. 1591, supra note 102, ¶ 3.
referral (Resolution 1590). Its mission was to supervise the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between Khartoum and the SPLA that was finalized in January 2005. None of those forces were dedicated to Darfur. This meant the only peacekeeping presence in Darfur was an understaffed and underfunded AU mission that had been deployed to monitor a non-existent cease-fire.\footnote{107} In other words, civilian protection was entrusted to a force with fewer resources, and a more limited mandate, than UNPROFOR in Bosnia. As in Bosnia, this reinforced the culture of impunity in Darfur by telling Khartoum, and the janjaweed, that they would not have to contend with a serious military presence.

The Security Council attempted to remedy this through Resolution 1706 (31 August 2006), authorizing a more robust UN force of 20,600 to augment the AU force with a stronger mandate for civilian protection. The resolution “invited” Sudanese consent, which was declined.\footnote{108} An apparent compromise was reached in Addis Ababa in November to create a hybrid AU-UN force, which would be more acceptable to Sudanese sensitivities, but President Bashir subsequently backed out of the agreement. Since then, Sudan has agreed to the deployment of 3000 UN personnel as part of a heavy support package working with the AU, and later, to the deployment of a 26,000 United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) with a mandate to protect civilians.\footnote{109} Nonetheless, only a fraction of the force has been deployed and Khartoum has set limits on its autonomy and composition, blocking the participation of specialized non-African personnel whose contribution is considered vital to the mission.\footnote{110} Despite the fact that both the ICC referral and UNAMID were authorized under Chapter VII, the Security Council has never moved beyond what was in practice a pacific settlement approach in which the terms of any peacekeeping mission would depend upon Sudanese consent and there would be no penalties for withholding it or for imposing conditions that amounted to obstruction.

Nor did the invocation of Chapter VII move either the UN or the AU away from neutral mediation as the principal instrument of conflict resolution any more than the creation of the ICTY altered international mediation efforts prior to Operation Deliberate Force. It is telling that on the day of the ICC referral, Secretary General Kofi Annan asserted that the war in

Darfur could only be addressed through a “return to negotiations in Abuja to bring it to a speedy end.” 111 These negotiations have produced a number of cease-fires and government commitments to disarm the militias, none of which have been honored. Their most significant result was the Darfur Peace Agreement, negotiated on 5 May 2006, between the government and one faction of the two main rebel groups. 112 The agreement did have a number of positive features regarding power-sharing, revenues, and disarmament, but its principal weakness was its reliance on the Sudanese government, rather than an international force, for the disarmament of the janjaweed—a commitment it failed to implement six previous times—and for maintaining a secure environment for refugees to return to their homes. No pressure was placed on Sudan to accept an international force to supervise the accord nor was any penalty imposed when the government escalated its attacks on the rebels in August. 113

This is not to argue against efforts to mediate a political settlement, which is probably the most realistic way to end violence against civilians. It is to argue that there is an inherent tension in simultaneously pursuing a judicial strategy that subjects the government to criminal scrutiny and an impartial, non-coercive mediating strategy that tries to elicit its cooperation—particularly when major UN and NGO studies have attributed responsibility to the very senior political and military officials with whom one would have to negotiate a peace agreement. 114 If one is committed to criminal justice, these are not legitimate interlocutors, but if one is serious about diplomacy, this will require at least the temporary subordination of criminal justice to the exigencies of conflict resolution. It will also require a movement away from a neutral to a coercive strategy of conflict resolution. In a case like Darfur or Bosnia in which the government believes that the war serves its interests better than a negotiated compromise, impartial mediation does little more than provide cover for a military solution. As in Bosnia, the key to changing this lies not in deploying legal instruments—those in power are unlikely to be deterred since they are already complicit in crimes for which they should be prosecuted—but rather coercive military and economic instruments to increase the costs and risks to Khartoum so that its self-interest coincides with ending criminal violence.

113. After Darfur’s Deal, AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, 4 Aug. 2006, at 5.
Coercive strategies will be difficult and contentious because they will have to be employed outside the UN multilateral framework unless alignments in the Security Council change. Some proponents of tougher actions have recommended economic measures that would be uncontroversial in terms of international law. The International Crisis Group has called for concentrating economic pressure on the regime through asset freezes and travel bans on senior officials implicated by UN reports, the identification of front companies for financing the militias in order to freeze their accounts, and for the augmentation of EU sanctions, currently limited to the defense sector, to cover all assistance to Sudan’s oil industry.\textsuperscript{115} In addition, citizens groups have initiated grassroots campaigns calling on universities, institutional investors, and state and local governments to divest their portfolios of stocks from companies that do business in Sudan.\textsuperscript{116}

Sanctions on Sudan, however, are unlikely to have a coercive impact comparable to those imposed on Serbia during the Bosnian war or Indonesia over East Timor. Unlike Belgrade and Jakarta, whose economies were in crisis, Sudan’s economy has been growing at almost 10 percent per year as the result of expanding oil production at a time of record prices.\textsuperscript{117} While tightened sanctions, and public pressures, could impose some costs and inconveniences on the regime, the Economic Intelligence Unit concludes that “this is not likely to jeopardize Sudan’s economic development [because] Asian partners, such as China, Malaysia and India are unwilling to risk the huge sums they have invested in the energy sector.”\textsuperscript{118} Similarly, while civil society pressures may lead some of the few remaining Western companies doing business in Sudan to withdraw, this is unlikely to extend to their Asian counterparts given the commitment of their governments to overseas energy development and the absence of comparable pressures at home.\textsuperscript{119}

Another option would be to threaten, or use, force outside of the Security Council, as was done during the Kosovo War in 1999. This would be legally controversial since a strict reading of the UN Charter would prohibit intervention in a state’s internal affairs unless explicitly authorized by the Security Council as part of its Chapter VII obligation to respond to a threat to the peace. Proponents of intervention point to the emergence of a new norm in international politics, the Responsibility to Protect, which was developed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Security (ICISS), an independent body of experts established by the Canadian government in response to a challenge from the Secretary General after the legal controversy

\textsuperscript{115} International Crisis Group, Getting the UN into Darfur, supra note 106, at 7–9.
\textsuperscript{116} Id. at 9–10.
\textsuperscript{117} Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Sudan, Country Report 8 (Feb. 2008).
\textsuperscript{118} EIU, Sudan, Country Report 4 (Feb. 2007).
\textsuperscript{119} EIU, Sudan, Country Report 22 (Dec. 2006).
following the Kosovo war and in light of the international community’s failure to act against genocide in Rwanda. The Responsibility to Protect holds that sovereignty is not an absolute license to do anything within one’s borders. It also entails a responsibility to protect one’s citizens and if a state defaults on that duty, that responsibility falls to the international community. In extreme cases of genocide or crimes against humanity, this could also include forcible humanitarian intervention. While the report argues humanitarian intervention should ideally be authorized by the Security Council—and calls on the permanent members to refrain from using the veto during humanitarian emergencies—it does lay out exceptional circumstances where force might be used legitimately without explicit Security Council approval.120

From this perspective, Khartoum’s complicity in mass atrocity in Darfur, and its obstruction of humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts, constitutes the kind of radical default on its responsibilities that would merit intervention even without UN authorization. In theory, this could involve nonconsensual humanitarian intervention to forcibly stop the killing.121 Most proposals, however, advocate the threat or use of force as part of a strategy of coercive diplomacy to “change the calculus in Khartoum and persuade them to let the U.N. in.”122 The most aggressive proposal, advocated by two former Clinton administration officials and a member of the Congressional Black Caucus, argues for giving Sudan an ultimatum for unconditional deployment; failure to comply would be followed by enforcement of a no-fly zone, air strikes on military assets, and a naval blockade of Port Sudan, which would have the effect of enforcing an oil boycott that could not be achieved through the Security Council.123 The International Crisis Group is more reluctant to endorse military action outside the UN framework, but nonetheless advocates NATO enforcement of the no-fly zone in Darfur already demanded in Resolution 1591 should the Security Council fail to act.124 A Council on Foreign Relations study recommends air strikes against military bases as the most effective way to concentrate pressure on Khartoum, noting the logistic[al] problems with the no-fly zone and the harm a blockade could inflict on the government in southern Sudan.125 In each proposal, the goal is not to

120. See Bellamy, supra note 73, at 34–36.
124. International Crisis Group, Getting the UN into Darfur, supra note 106, at 11.
stop the killing directly. As in Bosnia and Kosovo, it is to raise the costs and risks of the status quo to a point where the regime concludes that its security requires it to create a permissive environment for a multilateral peacekeeping force.

The argument that the “responsibility to protect” allows the unauthorized use of force, both generally and in Darfur, has generated considerable opposition. Many UN members, particularly from the South, view this as a license for powerful states to appropriate humanitarian language for self-serving interventions, particularly after the Iraq war. This partly explains Sudan’s success in generating a blocking coalition against tougher action and the decision at the UN 2005 World Summit to accept the principle of the Responsibility to Protect, but to limit authorization to the Security Council.126

This is also the view of most international lawyers, including many supporters of the ICC and the Darfur referral—who adopt a “restrictionist” view that the only exception to the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force outside of the Security Council is self-defense against an armed attack—something that applies to humanitarian intervention no less than it does to preventive war. William Schabas takes this position in an article defending the ICI’s inability to substantiate Powell’s genocide charge, in which he alleges that the United States has used the term because of “an important school of thought within the US government that considers a finding of genocide to authorize ‘humanitarian intervention,’ even in the absence of Security Council authorization.”128 A plain reading of the Genocide Convention indicates no such right. Article 8 only reinforces what the Charter already allows by obliging the contracting parties to “call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such actions under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of genocide.” Schabas goes on to characterize the Bush administration’s use of the genocide charge as “humanitarian sabre-rattling” to “tarnish Sudan, which must be on [the] short-list for the vacant Iraqi seat as a member of the ‘axis of evil.’”129

Yet, when Powell characterized the conflict in Darfur as genocide, he explicitly cited Article 8 in asserting that the United States would appeal to the UN rather than act unilaterally. The reason lies less in respect for the law than in the politics of US-Sudanese relations. Prunier documented

129. Id. at 882, 883.
tactical changes in Sudan’s political orientation, in the late 1990s, which were intended to end its political isolation and build political bridges to the United States.\textsuperscript{130} For Khartoum, 9-11 was an opportunity to expand this strategy to include counter-terrorism cooperation, particularly since Sudan was the former base of Al Qaeda. The Bush administration welcomed this cooperation and sought to strengthen it by expending considerable diplomatic capital on the Naivasha process, designed to end a war that had become a lightning rod for many of its conservative Christian allies.\textsuperscript{131}

The emergence of the Darfur crisis, just as the Naivasha process was concluding, came at an inopportune time for the administration. It also generated conflicting domestic pressures from, on the one hand, what Prunier calls the pro-Garang lobby, whose mobilization on the north-south civil war had shifted to Darfur, and the “realists,” who wanted to insulate Naivasha and intelligence cooperation from human rights considerations.\textsuperscript{132} The administration parried these pressures with a strategy of strong rhetorical condemnation and advocacy, unaccompanied by the expenditure of significant diplomatic capital. The seeming contradictions in Powell’s testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee are perfectly consistent with these priorities, as were reports that the United States interceded with the UN Sanctions Committee to dissuade it from naming Sudan’s National Security Minister, Salah Abdallah Gosh. He has been one of the main architects of Khartoum’s Darfur policy, but also a major intelligence asset who has been flown by private jet to CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia.\textsuperscript{133}

Moreover, most serious proposals for humanitarian intervention in Darfur do not use the Bush Doctrine in Iraq as their template. They are not pushing for an invasion to implement a regime-change agenda that has not been ratified multilaterally, but rather for the use of military coercion to enforce compliance with disarmament and civilian protection provisions that the Security Council has demanded but whose enforcement it has not explicitly authorized. This notion of implied authorization had been used to deploy Operation Provide Comfort to protect the Kurds in northern Iraq, and, more controversially, as the legal rationale for the authorization of the Kosovo war through NATO rather than the Security Council.\textsuperscript{134} Moreover, these interventions—like the proposals for Darfur—are consistent with the norms of the “responsibility to protect” in a way that the Iraq war is not. In

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\textsuperscript{130} Prunier, \textit{supra} note 58, at 88.
\textsuperscript{131} \textit{Id.} at 89–91.
\textsuperscript{132} \textit{Id.} at 138–40; see also li Bor, \textit{supra} note 63, at 185, on the initial US reluctance to raise the Darfur issue in the United Nations.
\textsuperscript{133} See Maggie Farley, \textit{UN Sanctions Four in Darfur Case}, L. A. \textsc{Times}, 26 Apr. 2006, at A17; Elizabeth Rubin, \textit{If Not Peace, Then Justice}, N. Y. \textsc{Times Mag.}, 2 Apr. 2006, at 42.
\textsuperscript{134} For contrasting views on this, see Christine Gray, \textit{International Law and the Use of Force} 26–35, 191–95 (2000); but see Wheeler, \textit{supra} note 127, at 154–69, 265–67.
\end{flushright}
the former cases, interventions were designed to rescue threatened populations that were under attack. In Iraq, where humanitarian rationales were presented post-hoc, no such threat existed in 2003, even though Iraq’s Anfal campaign against the Kurds in 1988, and its attacks on the Kurdish and Shi’ite populations in 1991, provided more legitimate opportunities for “the politics of rescue.”135 As Gareth Evans observed, “The rationale for coercive humanitarian intervention is not punishment for past sins, however grotesque, but to avert, here and now, the threat to large numbers of people, which are actually occurring or imminently about to occur.”136

These political and moral distinctions may not matter from a legal point of view if the frame of reference is a restrictionist reading of the UN Charter. The virtue of such an approach is that it erects a higher barrier against the abuse of power by states that use humanitarian language to justify self-serving interventions. But what impact would such an approach have on Sudan’s impunity for abuses against civilians under current circumstances? Schabas concludes his article by asserting that the ICC could make a difference: “[W]hether it is for genocide or crimes against humanity, the perpetrators now stand a reasonable chance of being brought to justice, and they know it.”137 Yet, is that really the case? All that perpetrators have witnessed for the last four years is the United Nations unwillingness to act. The United Nations inaction continues, despite Sudan’s reneging on repeated statements committing itself to end such violations. It is Khartoum’s confidence that it will not be penalized for its actions that is the real source of impunity in Darfur. Until that changes, the Darfur referral to the ICC is no less “criminal justice in a political vacuum” than was the ICTY for its first two-and-one-half years.

Some international lawyers and NGOs have argued that another possible change that could make a difference is a more aggressive prosecutorial strategy. In 2006, Antonio Cassese and Louise Arbour submitted briefs to the pre-trial chamber questioning the prosecutor’s decision not to demand that the Sudanese government allow investigations inside Darfur because of the court’s inability to provide protection to witnesses and victims. A more visible presence on the ground, they argued, would be the most effective way of reducing violence and protecting present and prospective victims.138 Cassese has also written critically of the prosecutor’s “small steps” strategy, focusing initially on mid-level perpetrators. A better strategy would have

137. Schabas, supra note 128, at 885.
been to move expeditiously to indictments of senior officials, which “might have dramatized the ongoing conflict in Darfur, even if those arrest warrants were to remain un-executed.” 139 Cassese acknowledges that the Sudanese government would almost certainly refuse the prosecutor’s request to hand over high-level indictees or conduct investigations in Darfur. That refusal, however, could be used by the prosecutor to ask the Security Council to “take into account such refusal to cooperate and envisage appropriate measures designed to secure cooperation.” 140

It is certainly possible that this kind of prosecutorial brinksmanship could break the deadlock in the Security Council by shaming its members into supporting a process for which they had voted—particularly if the publicity surrounding the indictments mobilizes civil society pressure on governments. The key is whether that would influence China, which had abstained on the ICC referral and had been the strongest defender of Sudan in the Security Council. John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen suggest that Beijing’s threat to veto resolutions punishing Sudan may be hollow, because the “growing perception that Beijing is turning a blind eye to continuing atrocities in Darfur could mar its international image as it prepares to host the 2008 Olympics.” 141 If they are correct, indicting senior officials may increase the reputational costs to China to the point where they either lean on Khartoum, or support enforcement actions in the Security Council. If a more aggressive prosecutorial approach puts pressure on governments to take more forceful action, the question is: action to do what? Many NGOs and international lawyers believe the primary focus should be on the arrest and extradition of those indicted by the court. However, Khartoum is unlikely to cooperate in a way that threatens those most responsible—namely, the regime’s leadership. At most, any judicial cooperation would likely resemble that of Libya in the Lockerbie trial, where those directly involved were extradited with the understanding that they not implicate their superiors. 142 If a higher profile prosecutorial strategy does help galvanize international political will, or creates a more credible fear of prosecution on the part of Sudan’s leaders, the first priority should be protection and prevention, not punishment. This means pushing the parties towards a cease-fire and securing Sudan’s consent to a robust UN peacekeeping mandate that would protect civilians and disarm the militias. Pressure should then be applied

140. Cassese, supra note 139, at 439.
for a broader political settlement that addresses the underlying sources of the conflict through a more equitable sharing of power and resources, and through ending Khartoum’s practice of arming tribal militias. In other words, the threat of prosecution can most effectively protect civilians if it is used as part of a strategy of coercive diplomacy that, in combination with other economic or military threats, alters Khartoum’s calculation that the war serves its interests.

As was the case in Bosnia, however, there is a potential conflict between criminal justice and the kind of coercive diplomacy described above. The former would demand prosecution not only of the janjaweed leaders and military commanders who oversaw them, but also of President Bashir and his inner circle. Indeed, Moreno-Ocampo has suggested that the long-term goal of his strategy is to move up the chain of command from mid-level perpetrators against whom he has the best evidence to their superiors who bore the greatest responsibility for their crimes.143

Yet this would be difficult if the threat of prosecution is another arrow in the quiver of coercive instruments to leverage Khartoum’s behavior. As in the case of bargaining with Milošević, the goal of pressure is to induce consent to the deployment of peacekeepers or the negotiation and implementation of a cease-fire, if not a peace agreement. This is likely to require the active cooperation of parties subjected to criminal scrutiny. In testimony before the US Congress, Alex de Waal noted that any effective UN peacekeeping force would monitor, rather than enforce, demilitarization and would require a comprehensive and robust cease-fire,144 both of which are dependent on the consent not only of the government, but also of rebel leaders who have also been implicated in criminal violence and may be under investigation by the ICC. The same cooperation would almost certainly be necessary for a broader political settlement. De Waal also cautioned against policies that Khartoum could interpret as the first steps toward regime change: “[P]ressure only works if there is an outcome that is ultimately acceptable to the person whom you are putting pressure on.”145 The ICC poses a potential impediment to such an approach because, as one study noted, a principled approach to prosecuting those most responsible for atrocity crimes in Darfur should “include the most important players of the ruling elite of Sudan.”146

Ending criminal violence in Darfur will therefore require some compromises with international criminal justice similar to those in Bosnia, at least in

145. Id. at 33; see also Alex de Waal, The Wars of Sudan, NATION, 19 Mar. 2007, at 16.
the short-to-medium term. This could involve: the prosecutor exercising his
discretion and maintaining a low profile during the negotiations and post-
conflict stabilization process, restrictions on the UN peacekeeping mandate
regarding the arrest of those under indictment, or invocation by the Security
Council of Article 16 of the Rome Statute, which allows it to suspend an
ICC investigation for renewable twelve month periods if it interferes with its
mandate to maintain or restore international peace and security. This does not
necessarily mean the abandonment of justice any more than Dayton meant
the dismantling of the ICTY or amnesty for Milošević. Criminal proceed-
ings could continue against spoilers or particularly heinous actors whose
cooperation is not crucial for the peace process and whose removal from
the political scene could contribute to postwar reconciliation. Moreover,
maintaining the active prospect of prosecution could also deter powerful
actors from becoming spoilers. However, as long as the transitional process
is dependent on the continuing cooperation of these actors, criminal cases
against them will have to be held in abeyance.

Many international lawyers and NGOs would object to this use of the
ICC as leverage in the same way that Pierre Hazan criticized the use of the
ICTY as a political instrument by Western governments. However, as we
saw in Bosnia, the law cannot be enforced while a war is raging and was
only able to play a significant role after there was sufficient political will to
end the conflict. Given the dependence of law on politics, it is incumbent on
the prosecutor to adopt a “do no harm” approach to any political processes
that might put an end to criminal violence and establish the conditions un-
der which international criminal justice can play a role— even if that role
is circumscribed by power realities. Though coercive diplomacy may differ
from pacific settlement strategies, which were employed for the first three
years of the Bosnian war and the duration of the war in Darfur, it is still a
bargaining relationship to which international criminal justice must adapt.

IV. CONCLUSION

One of the themes of David Kennedy’s, The Dark Sides of Virtue, is the
tendency of many in the human rights community to overpromise what the
law can deliver. He attributes this to their assumption that international gov-
ernance can “do globally what we fantasize or expect national governments
to do locally.” Their advocacy of the ICC is based on the same premise, that
“the political and military contexts in which war crimes were likely to occur
were somehow analogous to the social forces surrounding other criminal

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147. Hazan, supra note 37, at 191.
148. David Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism 31
(2004).
behavior."149 This is evident in the law enforcement language, used by many lawyers and NGOs, emphasizing that “not a single mid- or high-level civilian official, military commander or militia leader has been suspended from duty, investigated or prosecuted” for atrocities in Darfur.150 The implication is that continued criminal violence can be attributed to “the climate of impunity fostered by the failure to prosecute.”151 Since the problem has been diagnosed as the inadequacy of national law enforcement, the solution lies in politically deploying international legal instruments, such as expanding the scope of investigations or executing arrest warrants, to fill the gap.

In order to understand the problems with the domestic criminal law analogy, imagine someone saying in November 1941 that it has been two years since Germany invaded Poland, its armaments industry was exploiting hundreds of thousands of Polish citizens as slave laborers, and its Einsatzgruppen had machine-gunned to death hundreds of thousands of Jews—and not a single German military commander or high-level Nazi party official had been investigated or prosecuted for these crimes. While such a statement is factually correct, it obscures the fact that Nazi atrocities were deliberate acts of state policy for which the absence of judicial scrutiny was a symptom, not a cause. Similarly, atrocity crimes in Darfur are not the result of military excesses that the state has failed to prosecute. Rather, they are part of a systematic and well-planned government strategy, consistent with the regime’s historical practice of arming tribal militias for scorched-earth campaigns against populations seen as sympathetic to insurgencies in the south and in the Nuba Mountains.152 In fact, a detailed analysis by Human Rights Watch came to the same conclusion, attributing responsibility to “the highest levels of the government” and calling for the ICC Prosecutor to investigate President Bashir and his inner circle.153 Yet it is difficult to reconcile this analysis with the recommendation that the Sudanese government “investigate and fully prosecute all civilian and military personnel” involved in atrocities and “[f]ully cooperate with and facilitate” the ICC investigation.154 If the atrocities are indeed acts of state policy for which Sudan’s top

149. Id. at 129.
150. Human Rights Watch, Entrenching Impunity, supra note 114, at 52.
151. Human Rights Watch, Lack of Conviction: The Special Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur 4 (2006). This same attribution of impunity to the failure to prosecute informs Schabas’s treatment of the case, though he is less definitive in dismissing Sudan’s efforts to establish accountability mechanisms than is Human Rights Watch or the ICC Prosecutor. After citing Sudan’s assertion that it was prosecuting crimes in Darfur in response to Moreno-Ocampo’s June 2006 report to the Security Council, he suggests: “It may well be that, spurred by the Security Council referral, Sudan is doing an adequate job of addressing impunity. If that is the case, then the Court will have succeeded.” William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 178 (3d ed. 2007).
152. See Brunner, supra note 58, at 105; Feint & De Waal, supra note 59, at 24–25.
154. Id. at 3.
leaders are criminally responsible, what incentive do they have to cooperate with the Court, or alter their policies, as the result of its scrutiny? Eric Reeves captures this contradiction between analysis and advocacy with a quote from Darfuri leader in an IDP camp: “The government is part of the problem. You cannot catch yourself.”

In situations like Darfur, where the government is the most important part of the problem, the solution lies in politics, not law. Some advocates of international criminal justice acknowledge this. In a sympathetically critical analysis of the Security Council’s Darfur referral, Robert Cryer wrote: “Sending the matter to the ICC does mean that the Security Council is doing something, but other ways of limiting the conflict in Darfur are not being pursued as vigorously as they ought to be.” Which “other ways” are chosen, however, will set the parameters of international criminal justice. If that involves a negotiated settlement, even one achieved through forcible coercion, as was the case in Bosnia, the court will have to hold back from criminal proceedings, at least temporarily, against those whose cooperation is needed to negotiate and maintain a peace process. Such an approach would, to a degree, condone impunity and make for inconsistency in enforcing the law, but the alternative is either regime change—through internal forces or an external intervention—or an intervention comparable to the one in Kosovo, in which civilian protection does not depend on the continuing cooperation of the Sudanese government. The kinds of justice and accountability mechanisms that are possible in war’s aftermath cannot be divorced from the political strategies designed to bring a war to an end because the key to ending impunity in an ongoing war lies in the deployment of political instruments such as diplomacy, sanctions, or force, rather than in deterrent power of the law.

The ICC’s weaknesses as an agent of war-time deterrence in Darfur—what Payam Akhavan calls specific deterrence—does not necessarily rule out its promise to promote general deterrence vis-à-vis the world community. Writing about the ICTY, Akhavan noted that focusing on the weaknesses of the former, such as the limited impact of indictments on the behavior of Karadžić and Mladić in Bosnia, overlooks the ICTY’s contribution to the latter, its “long-term impact on the transformation of the political culture of both the former Yugoslavia and international society as a whole.”

156. Cryer, supra note 95, at 195, 222.
157. Akhavan, supra note 11, at 746.
these broader deterrent ambitions are dependent upon the capability and willingness of powerful states to back them up. The ICTY’s contribution to stigmatizing extremists, and deterring ethnic violence, in post-Dayton Bosnia only became possible because of the NATO air campaign and the US support for the Croatian and Bosnian ground offensives, as well US and EU policies of linking normalized economic relations to cooperation with the tribunal. Similarly, the ability of international criminal tribunals to have a broader deterrent impact, beyond the country in question, is dependent upon whether states and intergovernmental organizations are committed to a “no business as usual” policy with criminal regimes and movements, and to enforcement actions against perpetrators, or in defense of victims, even at some cost to themselves. What Darfur tells us about this commitment is not a cause for optimism.

The Darfur experience also points to one of the contradictions built into the preamble of the Rome Statute. After the first six phrases, which lay out the Court’s mission to root out impunity, the next two phrases attempt to reconcile this with the traditional principles of non-interference, reaffirming “that all States shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State” and emphasizing “that nothing in this Statute shall be taken as authorizing any State Party to intervene in an armed conflict or in the internal affairs of any State.” Yet, in cases like Darfur where the government is directly complicit in criminal activity, strict adherence to non-interference effectively shields the perpetrators from accountability. In such cases, ending impunity may require overriding the sovereignty of criminal governments, even without Security Council authorization. International tribunals can be important complements to humanitarian interventions. They are poor substitutes for them.
The Politics of Identity and Sexual Violence: A Review of Bosnia and Rwanda

Patricia A. Weitsman*

ABSTRACT

This article argues that particular assumptions about biology, ethnicity, genetics, and gender create a permissive environment for policies of sexual violence during war. It further asserts that the children born as a consequence of these policies become a prism for identity politics. The arguments regarding identity and war and the consequences on policies of sexual violence during wartime are illustrated through analyses of the Serbian militia’s rape campaigns in Bosnia in the early 1990s and the mass rape and killing of Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994.

I. INTRODUCTION

Being born with an identity formed in a wartime political environment often handicaps children for life. This is especially true if these children are born as a consequence of government-orchestrated rape campaigns, thus representing the legacy of violence a country has experienced. Although wars always

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manifest the crucial nature of identity politics, the children born in their
midst and aftermath offer an especially important prism for understanding
ideas about identity formation and how those ideas endure.

This article argues that the policies of sexual violence in wartime con-
tain fundamental information regarding how governments construct and
manipulate identity. War is the ultimate cauldron of identity politics. The
environment of heightened threat and hostility of war situations is both the
consequence of identity clashes and fertile ground for deepened entranch-
ment of identities. While an in-depth examination of the relationship between
war and identity is necessary, this article tackles only a subset of those is-

sues. It argues that certain assumptions about biology, ethnicity, genetics,
and gender construct a permissive environment for sexual violence during
war. It further asserts that children born as a consequence of these policies
represent the complexities of identity in an important and illustrative man-
ner. The assumptions about identity that underpin the policies giving rise to
the births of these children in the first place dictate the ways in which their
societies, governments, and families perceive them. The cloud of shame that
nearly always follows these children throughout their lives undermines their
human rights in critical ways.

II. IDENTITY AND THE POLICIES OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE DURING
WARTIME

Groups and individuals tend to set themselves apart in regard to certain so-
cial categories. This tendency profoundly affects their behavior in ways that
validate and perpetuate their identities.¹ Not only do these identities create
social conflict between groups, but they give rise to national identities. These
national identities have geographic implications as well. Frequently, identities
are grounded in territories, and nation-states evolve as a consequence. This
evolution also gives rise to institutional complexity: nuanced laws develop
around these identities, in regard to who belongs and who does not, i.e.,
citizenship and nationality. These laws and institutional structures support
and perpetuate socially constructed concepts of national identity.²

The way governments and society, in general, represent these identi-
ties reveals a great deal about the deeply rooted assumptions being made
about gender, ethnicity, and race. The discourse that surrounds the issues
of rape during wartime, for example, “ethnic cleansing,” “racial hygiene,”

¹ James D. Fearon & David D. Laitin, Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic
Identity, 54 Int’l Org. 845, 855 (2000); Madan Sarup, Identity, Culture and the Postmodern
World 7, 47 (Tasneem Raja ed., 1996).
² Sarup, supra note 1, at 182. See also Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections
“genocidal babies,” perpetuates myths about identity—that it is genetically determined, that it derives from the father, that it derives from the mother, that some blood is purer than other blood, and so forth. These discursive practices frequently lead to pervasive discrimination against specific social groups, outrageous acts of violence against women, and neglect of children who are born of rape during wartime.

The large scale rape of women during wartime is not new. Incidents of wartime rape, however, have been documented with increasing regularity in the twentieth century. For example, the rape and forced prostitution during World War II is well known, particularly the rape of German women by conquering Soviet soldiers, the enslavement of 200,000–400,000 “comfort women” by the Japanese army, and the rape of tens of thousands of women by Japanese soldiers in the Chinese city of Nanking. The rape of some 200,000 Bengali women during the war of independence from Pakistan is also well known. Tens, even hundreds, of thousands of rapes have been documented in conflicts in Liberia, Peru, Rwanda, Somalia, Uganda, El Salvador, Guatemala, Kuwait, the former Yugoslavia, and Sudan. In each case, the policies of sexual violence and exploitation have been different, and yet, there are striking similarities. This section seeks to winnow out some of the assumptions about identity that are embedded in mass rape.

In most militarized conflicts, rape serves as a tactic to intimidate, degrade, humiliate, and torture the enemy. In some cases, particularly where true genocide—the attempt to destroy the genus of a people or to completely annihilate a particular ethnic group—is unfolding, rape is a prelude to dismemberment and death. These are very different types of motivations. Rape as a tactic to degrade, humiliate, and undermine the enemy's morale may entail the desire to drive the enemy out of a particular geographic region of a country in order to assert ethnic and political dominance. This tactic has often been labeled rape as “ethnic cleansing.” In this regard, rape is


5. There are many scholars who describe rape as ethnic cleansing in this way. See a discussion in Patricia Weitsman, Children Born of War and the Politics of Identity, in Born
simply one of many torture tactics that culminate in a wide-scale exodus from a particular region.

Rape becomes a particularly potent form of torture in patriarchal societies in which a woman’s standing derives from her relationship to the men in her family: her brothers, father, husband, and sons. In many cases, if a woman is unmarried, her worth derives from her status as a virgin. Once raped, society no longer deems her marriageable or socially viable. In these situations, women are outcast and often sent out to become martyrs for the cause. What is notable here is not only that women’s worth derives from their relationships to men, but also that the shame of victimization is far worse than the perpetration of the crime. This situation has important implications not only for identity but for gender politics as well. Shaming the victims more than the perpetrators indicates that a woman’s value derives from “purity.” In other words, what becomes paramount for her own identity is her relationship to men to the extent that she has or has not engaged in sexual intercourse. In the event of violation, even if against her will in the context of wartime, her value is inextricably linked to a man interposing his body onto her own. In essence, a woman’s identity never really stands alone; it is always juxtaposed by her sexual relationships to men, whether coercive or consensual. These assumptions must already exist to support a policy of mass rape. If they do not, this policy loses its coercive power and may not be as successful in driving families apart or securing ethnic cleansing.

More elaborate identity assumptions underpin policies of forced impregnation and forced maternity. To demonstrate the importance of the identity assumptions that support policies of sexual reproduction in wartime, one can compare the policies of racial hygiene promoted by the Nazis before and during the Second World War with the Serbian militia’s policies of forced impregnation and maternity toward Bosnian Muslim women in the early 1990s. The Nazis viewed racial purity as the absence of any non-Aryan blood, whether maternally or paternally derived. Sexual intercourse between “racially impure” individuals and Aryans was prohibited because it would “taint” the offspring. Such beliefs about identity culminated in forced sterilization of “inferior races” and the “genetically diseased” during the war.


7. For more on this, see Patricia A. Weitsman, Women, War, and Identity, in Women and Human Security: Challenges of Conflict and Global Change (Richard A. Matthew & Heather Goldsworthy eds., forthcoming 2009).
8. See Carpenter, supra note 5.
This was true genocide, as it sought to destroy the genus of particular racial and ethnic groups. The Serbian militias, in contrast, sought to impregnate Bosnian Muslim women so that they would bear “Serbian” children. In this case, identity was viewed as exclusively paternally derived. The maternal contribution to identity must be completely assumed away for an ethnic group to embark on a policy of forced impregnation or forced maternity in order to promote “genocide” or “ethnic cleansing.” Otherwise, the rape campaign would be viewed as propagating more of the enemy. The Bosnian case section of this article discusses this concept in more detail.

Mass rape campaigns may be undertaken with the express purpose of impregnating women and forcing them to bear children. Through the implementation of policies of forced impregnation or forced maternity, rape serves not merely to torture or degrade, but also to “occupy the womb” of the women in question. The paramount assumption underpinning these policies is that identity is biologically and paternally given. Policies of forced impregnation and forced maternity are generally perpetrated to ensure that the women of the adversarial ethnic group will give birth to their “enemies’ children.” The women, in other words, serve as vessels that impart paternal identity. If the intent of a policy is to actually subjugate women to gang rape, impregnate them, and force them to bring the pregnancy to term, then rape is not being used for “ethnic cleansing” or “genocide.” Policies of mass rape designed to humiliate and degrade a population to such an extent that people leave en masse, thereby advancing the goal of ethnic cleansing, must be distinguished from rape with the intent of forcing women to bear children. One cannot view these policies in the same way: to do so is tantamount to accepting the view of identity that rapists perpetuate—that it is paternally derived—and to denying the cultural and genetic connection between mother and child.

Both types of rape campaigns, however, often produce the same result: thousands of children born of rape during wartime or in the war's aftermath. These war babies represent the complexities of identity politics in a number of ways. First, the way their families, societies, and governments perceive them reveals the malleability of identity. Second, these perceptions both reflect

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11. Id.
12. Carpenter, supra note 5; Weitsman, Women, War, and Identity, supra note 7; Weitsman, Children Born of War, supra note 5, ch. 7; Patricia A. Weitsman, The Discourse of Rape in Wartime: Sexual Violence, War Babies, and Identity, Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Portland, OR, 26 Feb.–1 Mar. 2003 (on file with author). In terms of criminal law, however, the intentions of the perpetrators matter. If the ultimate intention is to destroy the community, then prosecuting for genocide may be appropriate. The distinction here may be between the short-term goals of forced impregnation policies and the long-term goal of destroying a community. My thanks to Bert Lockwood for this insight.
and perpetuate myths about the sources from which identity derives. Third, these children show the devastating effect that myths about the construction of identity can have on human rights.

During wartime, questions of identity become outlined in sharp relief. Under conditions of threat, persecuted groups, or any social group, have a heightened sense of self. These groups will draw together, become more cohesive, and validate their identity. The source of cohesion and disintegration in any societal group derives from sentiment, and discourse provides an extremely powerful way to manipulate and construct sentiment. As we construct our enemies—or our “others”—our ethnicities, races, citizenships, and religions all become tools of exclusion. One important way these sentiments are experienced is through children of “mixed heritage” who result from rape during wartime.

One aspect of the challenge posed by children born of rape during wartime is that they embody both self and other. Their families and society are unable to disentangle them from the circumstances of their conception. As a consequence, these children are brought into the world under very difficult circumstances and with uncertain status. Identity revolves necessarily around difference and is understood only through contrast. War babies become a prism for these differences. Though technically a combination of the self-identity as well as “the other,” the way they are perceived does not always reflect that reality. Instead, these children are often viewed purely as “the other,” despite their birth mothers’ identities and despite the fact that members of their mothers’ ethnic groups usually raise them.

Once born, the identity of the war babies is inextricably linked to their rapist fathers. This link exists even if the paternal identity is completely unknown, which is usually the case because either the survivor did not know the rapist or because so many men raped the mother that establishing paternity without genetic testing is impossible. The child’s identity is tied to the father, even if the child never meets the father, and even if the child’s mother cares for and raises the child. This is a very powerful message about identity—how it is perceived, constructed, and imagined. The father’s ethnic identity and the shame surrounding the conception are the only factors that matter. This link also illuminates an assumption about gender relations in societies where policies of mass rape, forced impregnation, and forced maternity take place: the act of sexual violation that took place at conception renders meaningless the women’s contributions to their children’s identity.

15. See Carpenter, supra note 5, for an excellent and insightful analysis of the myriad ways these children are marginalized.
and upbringing. In essence, the acts of violence that culminated in conception negate the lifelong responsibilities of raising a child. This degrades both the experiences of women and the legacies of the violence, the war babies. It also gives rise to egregious infringements on the human rights of these children from birth throughout their entire lives.

The children born of rape in Bosnia are called “a generation of children of hate.” In Kosovo, they are known as the “children of shame.” In Rwanda, they are called “children of bad memories” “children of hate,” and “unwanted children.” In the context of the Vietnam war, children born to men of US origin also faced discrimination. These children were known as “children of the dust,” a Vietnamese expression referring to the poorest of the poor. In the aftermath of the large-scale rapes by government forces in Sudan in Darfur, mothers call children born to ethnic Africans “janjaweed,” which is the name given to the government-backed militias who participate in the atrocities, or “devils on horseback” as it translates in English. These are just some examples, all of which reveal a disturbing stigma attached to these children, even though they themselves obviously are not the ones who have the bad memories or the ones who hate. Yet, their identities are constructed in a way that remains connected to their fathers, even if paternal identity is unknown.

In war’s aftermath, governments have an opportunity to transform the perception of the identities of the children born of rape during wartime. Depending on the needs of a population and the perceptions of the enemy, there are important distinctions in the perceptions of children conceived during wartime. For example, the rape of French women by invading Ger-

16. Louise Branson, A Generation of Children of Hate: The Unwanted Children Conceived in the Rapes of Some 20,000 Women May Be the Most Lasting Scar Left by Yugoslavia’s Bitter Civil War, TORONTO STAR, 29 Jan. 1993, at D13. She describes one mother who calls her child a Chetnik baby.
22. See Carpenter, supra note 5. In contrast, the babies born in Britain during WWII to unwed mothers by departing soldiers led to a call for reform in “bastardy laws.” These children were considered the result of “self or race preservation” and were not to be condemned. They also were considered “unborn children . . . left to us in trust by our soldiers.” See SUSAN R. GRAYZEL, WOMEN’S IDENTITIES AT WAR 96 (1999). See also Susan R. Grayzel, The Mothers of our Soldiers’ Children, in MATERNAL INSTINCTS: VISIONS OF MOTHERHOOD AND SEXUALITY IN BRITAIN, 1875–1925, at 122 (Claudia Nelson & Ann Sumner Holmes eds., 1997).
human soldiers in the First World War prompted national debate regarding the legalization of abortion, so as to prevent the birth of “children of the barbarian.” In contrast, children born of rape in Bosnia and in Rwanda were not allowed to be adopted overseas because they were viewed as a critical means of repopulating their respective countries.

In summary, embedded in rape policies are important assumptions about identity. In cases of mass rape, which are employed as a mechanism of torture designed to bring about a mass exodus to a geographic region or as a prelude to death that culminates in genocide, the identity assumptions underpinning these policies emanate from both ethnicity and gender roles. In cases in which the goal is forced impregnation or forced maternity, it is inappropriate to describe these policies as genocide or ethnic cleansing. To do so is to adopt the rationale of the perpetrators—that identity is paternaly given. This rationale assumes that biology matters more than culture in determining identity because the father biologically passes on his identity. In other words, in constructing identity, the maternal contributions, both genetic and cultural, are marginal. Labeling these children at birth as genocidal orphans, children of hate, or little killers reflects this construction, and the discursive practices of the media perpetuate this practice.

The perceptions of children born of wartime rape reflect and propagate myths about identity. Governments play a large role in constructing those identities, especially through the implementation of policies of sexual violence and policies regarding the fate of the war babies during post-conflict reconstruction. Next this article offers two illustrative case studies: Bosnia and Rwanda.

III. BOSNIA: EARLY 1990S

The implosion of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the early 1990s provided for dramatic changes throughout the region. The
end of Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe brought the future of Yugoslavia into question. In July 1991, declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia led to a war between Croatia and Yugoslavia and, to a lesser extent, between Yugoslavia and Slovenia. They reached a tenuous peace by early 1992. Not long thereafter, however, Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence. Civil war among Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in Bosnia broke out and lasted for several years. Innumerable atrocities occurred during the war, which ultimately took approximately 100,000 lives, displaced two million people, and resulted in the rape of tens of thousands of women and girls. No place was safe—in the UN safe haven of Srebrenica more than 8,000 men and boys were killed.27 No one will ever know an exact death toll; mass graves continue to be uncovered and many of the missing have never been found.28

One important characteristic of the war in Bosnia was the sexual violence committed by the Serbian militias principally against Bosnian Muslim women.29 Torture camps, in which men and women were segregated, were set up around the country. Men were subjected to beatings, cannibalism, castrations, and other extreme forms of torture, frequently until death. Women were repeatedly gang raped, sometimes by more than forty men in one day, for months until impregnated.30 Some camps served exclusively as rape camps, such as the one at Foca, where the Serbian policies of mass rape, forced impregnation, and forced maternity were implemented.31

Serbian authorities dictated the strategy of mass rape and forced impregnation. Throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, the camps were set up in nearly identical ways—they even had the same layout and patterns of rape. In addition, the rapes occurred simultaneously in noncontiguous sections of Bosnia.32 Rasema, one survivor who identified her neighbor as one of the

28. For a detailed discussion of these cases, see Weisman, Women, War, and Identity, supra note 7.
29. My focus here is on the rape and forced impregnation of Bosnian Muslim women, who were the principal targets of the sexual violence. However, they certainly were not the only victims. Numerous rapes were committed against women and men of other ethnic groups as well.
31. One can also read the narratives of the women who have testified at the International Criminal Tribunal Yugoslavia (ICTY). There were 16 individuals from Foca alone who testified in 2000. The documents and transcripts are available at http://www.un.org/icty.
32. Lisa Sharlach, Rape as Genocide: Bangladesh, the Former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda, 22 NEW POL. SCI. 89, 97 (2000). See also Todd A. Salzman, Rape Camps as a Means to Ethnic Cleansing: Religious, Cultural, and Ethical Responses to Rape Victims in the Former Yugoslavia, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 348 (1998); Jennifer Scott, Systematic Rapes, REUTERS,
three men who raped her, reported: “I said, ‘Sasha, remember your mother. Remember your sister. Don’t do it.’ He said, ‘I must. If I do not they will hurt me. Because they have ordered me to.’”

Irma Oosterman, a member of the prosecution investigation team, testified against Serbian leader Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic in July 1996. “The soldiers told often that they were forced to do it. They did not say who forced them to do it, but they were ordered to do it.” Her testimony continued, “They wanted to make Serb or Chetnik babies. The pattern was, yes, all over the same.”

Survivors’ accounts provide additional evidence that forced impregnation and maternity were goals of the Serbian authorities. Narratives told by hundreds of women held at camps around Bosnia suggest that women were raped repeatedly and, once impregnated, held until abortion was no longer an option. In the words of one survivor of the Doboj camp:

They said that each woman had to serve at least ten men a day. . . . God, what horrible things they did. They just came in and humiliated us, raped us, and later they told you, “Come on now, if you could have Ustasha babies, then you can have a Chetnik baby, too.” . . . Women who got pregnant, they had to stay there for seven or eight months so they could give birth to a Serbian kid. They had their gynecologists there to examine the women. The pregnant ones were separated off from us and had special privileges; they got meals, they were better off, they were protected. Only when a woman’s in her seventh month, when she can’t do anything about it anymore, then she’s released. Then they usually take these women to Serbia. . . . They beat the women who didn’t get pregnant, especially the younger women; they were supposed to confess what contraceptives they were using.

Many survivors repeat accounts such as these. One survivor of a rape camp at Kalinovik, where about 100 women were held and gang-raped, recounted that the rapists continually told the women, “You are going to have our children—you are going to have our little Chetniks,” and that the women who became pregnant were left alone.

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Thus women were detained and forced to endure repeated gang rapes intended to impregnate them and were repeatedly told that they were being raped in order to “plant the seed of Serbs in Bosnia,” to give birth to little “Chetniks,” to deliver a Serbian baby, and so forth. The soldiers who participated in these rapes told their victims time and again that they would be denied abortion and detained until termination of the pregnancy was out of the question. The soldiers said that they were implementing these policies of forced impregnation and maternity per their superiors’ orders. Given that the Serbian militias had undertaken such a plan, the next question is, on what assumptions about identity were they operating?

Above all, to promote a policy of forced impregnation and maternity, the Serbian militias had to assume that biology was paramount in shaping the identity of a child. They had to further assume that paternal identity would be the overriding force in the newly created life. In other words, a woman had a passive role in transmitting identity, even though the offspring was genetically 50 percent hers and, if raised by her, culturally 100 percent hers. What is interesting is that even if biology is privileged in this conception of identity, a socially constructed idea of biology is what prevails. This is especially noteworthy in the Bosnian case, considering the minimal racial or biological differences between the Bosnian Muslims and Serbians: both were Slavs.

The identity politics surrounding the birth of war babies born to Bosnian Muslim women culminated in grievous infringements on the human rights of both the children and the mothers—human rights that are very nearly impossible to reconcile. The high rates of infanticide and the acceptance of these incidents as natural reflect the ways in which the rights of these children are severely undermined. Further, as discussed earlier, the language used to describe and label these children is extremely derogatory. All the labels

38. Id. at 110–11.
39. Id.
40. See Lynda E. Boose, Crossing the River Drina: Bosnian Rape Camps, Turkish Impalement, and Serb Cultural Memory, 28 Signs: J. Women in Culture & Soc’y 71, 75 (2002). Boose’s argument is extremely interesting—that ultimately Bosnian Muslim identity was linked to the Turks by the Serbians despite the fact that in reality there is no connection. But the constructed memory and association of them by the Serbians culminated in the dreadful sexual violations witnessed in the war.
41. Women who survive these horrendous experiences have undergone egregious human rights violations. The children born of these experiences are, of course, innocent. Yet because they represent, or stand in for, the perpetrators of the crime to their mothers, they are frequently punished in terrible and unjust ways.
42. See Weitsman, Children Born of War, supra note 5; Carpenter, Surfacing Children, supra note 5, at 458, quoted in Beverly Allen, Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia 99 (1996) (explaining that many women “attempt to kill their babies at birth in a reaction that, speaking strictly in terms of the mother’s psychological well-being, might even be considered healthy”).
connect the children to their rapist fathers, a legacy they can never escape. The Bosnian government’s refusal to allow these war babies to be adopted abroad makes escaping from the stigma of their birth impossible.

IV. RWANDA: 1994

In 100 days, the Tutsi population of Rwanda was decimated—nearly 75 percent was killed. The total number of people who died is estimated at about 800,000. The bloodbath that characterized Rwanda between April and July 1994 is nearly impossible to comprehend. Even more chilling is the manner in which the deaths were perpetrated. Neighbors killed neighbors with machetes, knives, and any other readily available weapon. There was no refuge—children brought to their neighbors’ houses for protection were killed by their protectors. Churches, hospitals, and schools were appropriated as slaughterhouses. Tutsis attempting to escape were hunted down relentlessly and killed.

Egregious atrocities took place during the Rwandan war. The Hutu government campaigned day and night for violence against Tutsi men, women, and children. In the words of one survivor: “All the day this was the only thing the radio played. What you heard on the radio, you never think it could be wrong. They told you, ‘Kill, kill, kill! The enemy must die! Babies! Don’t spare the elders. Don’t loot before, kill first.’”

The Rwandan genocide contained an important gender component. Much of the propaganda leading up to the killing was directed at Tutsi women. For years leading up to the genocide, newspapers and radio stations gradually escalated the messages, thus increasing the hostility between Hutus and Tutsis. In March 1992, the government’s radio station, Radio Rwanda, warned of an impending attack on Hutu leaders in Bugesera by Tutsis. This was a false report designed to spark massacres of Tutsis. The propaganda only escalated. Newspapers contained cartoons designed to underscore the messages of hate and violence that the government tried to foment. Hutus throughout Rwanda picked up and repeated this language.

43. Estimates vary as to how many Rwandans were killed, but the number that appears most frequently is 800,000. See Alan J. Kuperman, Provoking Genocide: A Revised History of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, 6 J. Genocide Res. 61 (2004).
44. See Mahmoud Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers 4–7 (2001); Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story 325–27 (1999).
46. Weitsman, Children Born of War, supra note 5, at 115.
47. Des Forges, supra note 44, at 66–68.
The propaganda targeted Tutsi women in particular, especially in regards to their supposed promiscuity and their feelings of superiority toward Hutu men, who were considered unattractive and lower class. Radio broadcasts repeatedly told Hutus to be wary of Tutsi women, who were agents of their brothers, fathers, and sons. The propaganda depicted Tutsi women as seductress spies, who believed they were far too good for Hutu men. As a consequence, much of the violence was directed at women. One Tutsi woman, who was taken by the Interahamwe (Hutu militias) to observe the mass slaughter and be the lone survivor to tell the tale to God of the Tutsis’ demise, saw innumerable atrocities, particularly committed against women’s bodies. She witnessed the spearing of a baby as it emerged from its mother’s body, a multitude of rapes with foreign objects, such as machetes and spears, and the burning of women’s pubic hair afterwards. Pregnant women were sliced open and the fetuses removed from their bodies.

Mass rape was a critical part of the Rwandan genocide. It is estimated that 90 percent of Tutsi women and girls who survived the genocide were sexually molested in some manner, principally and systematically by the Interahamwe. According to one study, Butare province alone has more than 30,000 rape survivors. Frequently, rape was merely a prelude to death. Some of the women were penetrated with tools of all sorts—spears, gun barrels, bottles, or the stamens of banana trees. Women’s sexual organs were mutilated with machetes, boiling water, and acid, and their breasts were cut off.

Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, the National Minister of Family and Women’s Affairs, was sent to her hometown to quell Butare’s revolt against the genocide campaign. While rounding up the women for slaughter, Nyiramasuhuko commanded the militias to be sure they raped the women before killing them. She also used rape to reward the soldiers for their killings, urging them on time after time. According to witnesses, Nyiramasuhuko’s commands

48. Nowrojee, supra note 19.
50. Sharlach, Gender and Genocide in Rwanda, supra note 45, at 395.
52. Landesman, supra note 49.
54. Landesman, supra note 49.
generated collective sadism in Butare. One woman survivor, for example, was taken as a sex slave by her neighbors, who tortured her nightly under the conditions that prevailed during Nyiramahuku’s supervision. This survivor “remembered two things most of all: the stamens from the banana trees they used to violate her, leaving her body mutilated, and the single sentence one of the men used: ‘We’re going to kill all the Tutsis, and one day Hutu children will have to ask what did a Tutsi child look like.’”56 As in the former Yugoslavia, women were often held in separate quarters, beaten, and repeatedly gang-raped for days on end. The Hutu militias took some women as sexual slaves and held them for years. This situation made Rwanda home to something more than genocide. The torture and mass rape that were a part of the atrocities went beyond mere instrumental killing. It also meant that new children came into the world in the wake of the disaster—possibly more than 10,000 babies were born as a consequence of these rapes.57

The systematic rape that took place during the widespread killing in Rwanda was undertaken with the express purpose of degrading, humiliating, punishing, and torturing Tutsi women. For example, Jean Paul Akayesu, the bourgmestre of Taba commune, Prefecture of Gitarama, was found responsible for the multiple rapes of over thirty women that took place under his auspices. He also had degraded numerous women by forcing them to undress and engage in humiliating activities while naked in public.58

Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, who held the office of Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research in the Interim Government, was responsible for representing government policy in regard to post-secondary school education and scientific research. During the genocide, he supervised killings during the month of April and personally led attacks of soldiers and Interahamwe against Tutsi refugees in Kigali-Rural prefecture, at the Parish Church and adjoining school in Gikomero, where several thousand people were killed. During the attack on the school in Gikomero, the militia selected women from among the refugees, carried them away, and raped them before killing them.59 During the criminal tribunal proceedings, Witness GAG testified that during the shooting she ran towards the classrooms because her four-year-old child was there. She hid there with four other women, while others escaped outside the classroom.

From behind the blackboard, she was able to see the killings from the side, and she saw the killers standing at the classrooms doors slashing people as they ran out. The attackers put beautiful girls aside and she heard the girls cry out

56. Landesman, supra note 49.
57. Wax, supra note 25; Olojede, supra note 25; Lorch, supra note 24.
later. The attackers specifically told them “we are going to rape you and taste Tutsi women,” to which the girls replied “instead of raping us, it is better that you kill us once and for all.” In cross-examination, the Witness explained that despite a lot of noise in the area she was able to hear people praying as they fled and even what the girls said. The attackers were dressed in either military or Interahamwe uniforms, with rags on their heads like savages. Mostly Tutsis were being attacked. The attackers found the Witness, her child and the four women. One of the attackers told her to give him her watch and money, while three girls were ordered to the side to join the other pretty girls. The Witness explained that the attacker asked to see her ID and then told her to show it to the other men. The other men looked at it and said that the she was going to die. They slashed her breast and her head until she was unconscious. She awakened at 5:00pm outside the classroom on top of dead bodies.\textsuperscript{60}

In another account, Witness GEP asserted that during a different massacre supervised by Kamuhanda, about twenty girls were selected and led away in a vehicle while the killings continued. The witness said that Kamuhanda left after the departure of the girls. The witness later learned that the women and girls were taken to a camp where the attackers raped and killed all but one of them.\textsuperscript{61}

Assailants sometimes mutilated women in the course of a rape or before killing them. They cut off breasts, punctured the vagina with spears, arrows, or pointed sticks, or cut off or disfigured body parts that looked particularly “Tutsi,” such as long fingers or thin noses. They also humiliated the women. One witness from Musambira commune was taken with some 200 other women after a massacre. They were all forced to bury their husbands and then to walk “naked like a group of cattle” some ten miles to Kabgayi. . . . When the group stopped at nightfall, some of the women were raped repeatedly.\textsuperscript{62}

Both gender and ethnicity played a key role in the mass rape of Tutsi women. In the interviews that followed the genocide, most of the survivors described how their assailants remarked on their ethnicity before, during, or after the rape. The remarks included: “We want to see how sweet Tutsi women are,” “You Tutsi women think that you are too good for us,” “We want to see if a Tutsi woman is like a Hutu woman,” “If there were peace, you would never accept me,” “You Tutsi girls are too proud.”\textsuperscript{63} One rape survivor described how, after being raped, her assailant said, “Now the Hutu have won. You Tutsi, we are going to exterminate you.” He then took her inside, put her on a bed, and held one leg open, while another held

\textsuperscript{61} Id. ¶ 496. Most of the individuals convicted by the ICTR thus far have been found guilty of charges of organizing and overseeing systematic rapes, perpetrated by themselves and/or their subordinates.
\textsuperscript{62} Des Forges, supra note 44, at 215.
\textsuperscript{63} Novroze, supra note 19, at 12.
her other leg. “He called everyone who was outside and said, ‘you come and see how Tutsikazi are on the inside.’ Then he cut out the inside of my vagina. He took the flesh outside, took a small stick and put what he had cut on the top. He stuck the stick in the ground outside the door and was shouting, ‘Everyone who comes past here will see how Tutsikazi look.’”\(^\text{64}\) One Rwandan aide worker, responding to a question about the reasons for the mass rape, said, “Hutu men wanted to know Tutsi women, to have sex with them. Tutsi women were supposed to be special sexually.”\(^\text{65}\) The identity politics underpinning the mass rape in Rwanda derived from two principal sources: the view of Tutsi women as sexual objects requiring subjugation and the patriarchal structure of society.\(^\text{66}\) Many of the rape survivors from the Rwandan genocide were held as sexual slaves—sometimes collectively, sometimes as the private property of one individual. Some were held for days, others for years. The violence directed against these women was stunning. As one journalist said, “Tutsi women were made for sexuality and beauty, for royal courts. That’s how we were educated. People from the north . . . wanted to take Tutsi as mistresses because they were forbidden to have them.”\(^\text{67}\) The patriarchal structure of society also was critical in allowing policies of mass rape to prevail. Women were largely the dependents of male relatives, and life centered on their roles as wives and bearers of children. Prior to the genocide, women were most valued for the number of children they could produce, that number (6.2 per woman) was one of the highest in the world in the pre-1994 era.\(^\text{68}\) Once rendered unmarriageable by sexual violation, these women’s societal value became marginal.

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\(^{64}\) Id. at 32.

\(^{65}\) Human Rights Watch/FIDH Interview, Member, Association des femmes chefs de familles, Kigali (28 Mar. 1996), quoted in Nowrojee, supra note 19.

\(^{66}\) Mambani, supra note 44, at 54; Des Forges, supra note 44, at 215. There are two broad schools of thought regarding the significance of the distinction between the Hutu and Tutsi. The first highlights the difference in the two groups; the second emphasizes the sameness between them. For the first, proponents argue that the two identity groups have different physical characteristics (e.g., height) and different blood factors (e.g., sickle cell trait), different cultural memories, and/or different historical origins. The school of thought arguing that the Hutu/Tutsi distinction is insignificant asserts that the difference between the two groups is principally economic and cultural, but not genetic, particularly as the two groups have integrated, intermarried, and cohabitated. In fact, all of the major clans in Rwanda include Hutu and Tutsi (and Twa). This perspective holds that the difference between Hutu and Tutsi stems principally from social selection and privilege, endowed on the Tutsis by the Belgian colonizers in the colonial and pre-colonial era. This school of thinking about identity emphasizes the role of colonization in constructing the rift between Hutu and Tutsi. During colonization, the Hutu/Tutsi difference became racialized; Tutsis were constructed as nonindigenous, Hutus as indigenous to Rwanda. See Mambani, supra note 44, at 41–75, 76–102; Kuperman, supra note 43, at 63; Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (1998).

\(^{67}\) Nowrojee, supra note 19, at 12.

\(^{68}\) Id.
The Rwandan government utilized rape as a tool in its campaign of hatred against the Tutsis.\textsuperscript{69} Instead of using rape as a mechanism to propagate more Hutus, it used rape as a mechanism to try to take life. Nearly 70 percent of the women raped contracted HIV. Rwandan President Paul Kagame said, “We knew that the government was bringing AIDS patients out of the hospitals specifically to form battalions of rapists.”\textsuperscript{70} This differentiates the mass rape in Rwanda from that in Serbia. In Rwanda, rape was a tool used to destroy Tutsi women; it was not undertaken with the express purpose of impregnating them. Despite the intended purpose of the mass rape campaigns, a huge number of children were born as a consequence. One estimate puts the number at as many as 10,000 babies considering that some women held as sexual slaves bore more than one.\textsuperscript{71}

As in Bosnia, the children born of rape in Rwanda have suffered egregious violations of their human rights. They are stigmatized, labeled “unwanted children,” “children of bad memories,” “children of hate,” “genocidal children,”—all names that reflect their identity as inextricably linked to their fathers.\textsuperscript{72} Many of the children were given names, such as “little killers,” “child of hate,” “the intruder,” “I am at a loss,” and so forth.\textsuperscript{73} The stigma attached to these babies from birth has resulted in large-scale abuses of their human rights. Infanticide rates were extremely high, and many mothers abandoned their children at birth or neglected them after birth, allowing them to die.\textsuperscript{74} For those women who are raising their children, their anger and resentment give rise to abuse.\textsuperscript{75} As these children grow up and become aware of the fact that their fathers were rapists whose identities are impossible to establish, life becomes even more difficult. In the words of one rape victim: “When people kill your family and then rape you, you cannot love the child.”\textsuperscript{76}

\textbf{V. CONCLUSION}

How identity is constructed has enormous bearing on the policies of sexual reproduction and violation during wartime. In cases in which identity derives from both maternal and paternal lines, sexual reproduction of the enemy will be prohibited. When identity is paternally given, and women are represented

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{69} For a discussion of this policy aspect, see Des Forges, supra note 44, at 10, 215.
\item \textsuperscript{70} Landesman, supra note 49.
\item \textsuperscript{71} Wax, supra note 25.
\item \textsuperscript{72} See Nowrozie, supra note 19, at 39; Wax, supra note 25; Olojede, supra note 25; Lorch, supra note 24.
\item \textsuperscript{73} Wax, supra note 25.
\item \textsuperscript{74} Nowrozie, supra note 19, at 40. Leslie Shanks & Michael J. Schull, Rape in War: The Humanitarian Response, 163 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N. J. 9 (2000).
\item \textsuperscript{75} Wax, supra note 25; Olojede, supra note 25.
\item \textsuperscript{76} McKinley, supra note 18.
\end{itemize}
as passive bystanders in imparting identity, policies of forced impregnation and maternity may result during wartime. Rape campaigns derive their coercive power from the view of women in relationship to men, their status as married or marriageable, virgin or defiled, as well as from the belief that the crime lies in being the victim rather than the perpetrator. The cases of Bosnia and Rwanda offer similarities and differences in the way in which identity politics played out. The differences emanated from the motivations of the governments. For the Serbian militias, the desire to degrade, humiliate, and impregnate Bosnian Muslim women with “little Chetniks” was paramount. In Rwanda, the Hutus sought to degrade, humiliate, torture, and destroy the Tutsi women. Different constructs of identity culminated in different policy intentions.

The children born in the aftermath of these mass rape campaigns also reflect important assumptions about identity. Because their identities are inextricably linked to their fathers and because of the circumstances of their conception, they become subject to gross violations of their human rights. As these children become adults, it is more essential than ever to come to a better understanding of the identity politics that surround their existence.